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ENGLISH LAW IN THE AGE OF THE BLACK DEATH, 1348-1381: A 
TRANSFORMATION OF GOVERNANCE AND LAW. By Robert c. 
Palmer. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1993. 
Pp. xiv, 452. $49.95. 
The Black Death wrought a terrible toll on England. Approxi-
mately one-third of the country's population was lost to the bubonic 
plague between the years 1348 and 1350.1 While the Plague killed 
indiscriminately, it hit the members of the lower social orders the 
hardest. The glut in the English labor market that existed at the 
time was thus eliminated, giving the surviving members of the lower 
orders more bargaining power in their dealings with the landhold-
ing classes than they had ever previously enjoyed. 
In his book, English Law in the Age of the Black Death, 1348-
1381, Robert Palmer2 contends that the Plague gave impetus to 
changes in the essential nature of English governance. He claims 
that in an effort to preserve the existing distribution of powers 
within society in the face of the Black Death, the upper orders 
formed a cohesive government in order to hold the upper and lower 
orders to their respective obligations (p. 1). To that end, the Eng-
lish government used the law as a means of controlling class struc-
ture and interclass interaction (p. 5). These changes thereby 
qualitatively transformed the English government into a govern-
ment of "inherent authority," meaning that the newly intrusive gov-
ernment "took responsibility for the regulation and direction of the 
whole of society" (p. 1). 
Palmer's major thesis runs counter to traditional views of Eng-
lish governance following the Black Death. According to tradi-
tional historiography, the English government's steady increase in 
power was caused in large part by the skillful administration of a 
single man, King Edward III (pp. 9-10 & n.1). Edward consoli-
dated and expanded his power by successfully waging war abroad 
and using his war profits as patronage to pacify the domestic elites. 
Such patronage allegedly fostered a spirit of trust and cooperation 
among Edward, the nobility, and the clergy. This increased cooper-
ation allowed the newly centralized government effectively to ex-
pand its power and extend its influence. Despite this increased 
cooperation, however, the period found increased power struggles 
among the upper classes (p. 11). Traditional historiography thus 
contends that the Black Death presented Edward's administration 
1. JOHN HATCHER, PLAGUE, POPULATION AND nm ENGLISH ECONOMY, 1348-1530 at 21-
22 (1977). 
2. Cullen Professor of History and Law, University of Houston. 
1768 
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with a crisis to overcome but that the plague did not provoke a 
qualitative change in the relations between English government and 
English society (p. 11). 
Similarly, conventional history traces the expansion in four-
teenth century English theories of liability not to a change in the 
style of governance but to the ability of skillful lawyers. Talented 
lawyers were able to manipulate standard writ forms in order to 
increase potential bases of liability. Contemporary justices, using 
only the internal logic of the law as their guide, then supposedly 
incorporated these theories of liability into the existing common 
law (pp. 61, 296, 299). . 
Against this general background, Palmer contends that the dem-
ographic changes resulting from the Black Death constituted the 
chief catalyst in bringing about fundamental changes in medieval 
England's social order. The threat to the social order that the Black 
Death posed was not translated directly into economic upheaval; 
there is no evidence to suggest that any economic crisis occurred in 
England prior to the 1370s (p. 4). In fact, because overpopulation 
was severe prior to the Black Death, there was no threat to the 
kingdom's labor supply even after the Plague struck, as indicated by 
the absence of vacant arable land in England during the 1350s.3 
Palmer contends that the threat to economic organization was indi-
rect: the increased ability of the laboring classes to bargain due to 
the decreased labor pool impacted the power structure of. tradi-
tional feudal society (pp. 15-17). 
Palmer maintains that the upper orders drew together into a co-
hesive government to consolidate and enhance governmental 
power. This increase in power was utilized to preserve the social 
status quo by coercing each Englishman, whether he belonged to 
the upper or lower orders, to carry out his traditional obligations. 
In forming a cohesive government, a new class - the gentry - was 
created. Additionally, increased powers were given to local author-
ities to create a more congenial governing apparatus. 
In an effort to preserve the social hierarchy, the Crown at-
tempted to regulate the whole of English society through legislative 
acts, such as the Statute of Labourers.4 To enforce these kingdom-
wide regulations in the various localities, the central government 
granted local peace officers broad powers of inquiry. They were 
also granted the ability to rule on felonies and trespasses according 
to the common law (p. 23). Palmer claims that the empowerment 
of local officials was largely responsible for the creation of the gen-
try, who were "substantial local people whose position is strongly 
3. P. 4 (citing J.L. BOLTON, THE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH ECONOMY, 1150-1500 at 208-14 
(1980)). According to Palmer, Bolton found no labor shortage until after the 1360s. 
4. Statute of Labourers, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, chs. 1-7 (Eng.). 
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related to the exercise of state authority" (p. 24). While this change 
took place over a number of years, Palmer places the "transition 
point" fifteen years after the Black Death (p. 294). The gentry re-
placed the "knightly classes" as the lowest classification among the 
upper orders (p. 294). Unlike the Christian warring elite, the gentry 
did not base their power on their personal authority or class status 
but on their function as agents of the central government. 
In addition to creating a new class within the upper orders, the 
Crown made efforts to reconcile its differences with the rest of Eng-
land's elite. As a means of ensuring the peaceful transition from 
knight to gentry, the gentry were granted more rights in relation to 
the Crown at criminal law. For instance, the Statute of Treasonss 
limited the scope of treason. Riding armed or covertly with the in-
tent to murder or kidnap became a mere felony or a trespass, the 
latter of which was not even punishable by forfeiture of land. Pre-
viously, such actions were regarded as treasonous offenses, punish-
able by death. With the Statute of Treasons, even judgments that 
resulted in the forfeiture of land now reserved the right of escheat 
for whoever would have rightfully had it otherwise. Therefore, 
Palmer contends, the statute greatly benefited landholders. Fur-
thermore, limits were placed on the royal range of action in purvey-
ance - the forced sale of private property to satisfy royal needs.6 
In the same vein, the government of Edward III pursued a pol-
icy of inclusion and cooperation with the Church. Instead of feud-
ing with bishoprics and dioceses as he did in the 1340s by applying 
pressure through litigation, Edward granted the clergy more legal 
freedom from royal authority in the 1350s.7 The new spirit of com-
promise was exemplified in the elevation of William Bateman, 
Bishop of Norwich, to the King's Council in 1351. Palmer notes 
that the change in attitude toward the clergy did not come with the 
English victory at the Battle of Crecy in 1346, but only occurred in 
the aftermath of the Black Death. 
In the second part of his book, Palmer contends that one of the 
twin purposes of the newly cohesive government was to coerce the 
upper orders to stand by their obligations as a means of preserving 
the social order. The Black Death produced a credit crisis, as a high 
mortality rate among debtors, creditors, and contractual partners 
5. Statute of Treasons, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, ch. 2 (Eng.). 
6. P. 25. Purveyors were forbidden from engaging in a variety of actions: valuing prop-
erty lower than the market rate, taking trees near houses, taking more sheep than were nec-
essary, keeping the sheep's wool for themselves, and so on. 
7. For example, The Ordinance for the Clergy (1352) reserved for ecclesiastical courts the 
right to determine when a benefice was open, required that indictments of clergymen specify 
the particular crime, and held that a bishop's temporalities could not be seized for contempt 
under quare non admisit. P. 52 (citing Ordinance for the Clergy, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, chs. 1-9 
(Eng.)). 
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enticed people to renege on their commercial obligations. Penal 
bonds, punitive remedies under detinue of charters,s and uses9 all 
came into vogue because their utilization encouraged more mem-
bers of the upper orders to stand by their commercial obligations. 
Under traditional covenant law, if one broke a contract, the plain-
tiff could be awarded damages in compensation for the period of 
nonperformance, but not in place of future performance. The pri-
mary concern was fairness between the parties, not deterring future 
nonperformance (pp. 71-72). Penal bonds were enforced prior to 
the Black Death. Before the Plague, however, they could be en-
forced for default in performance of agreements but not for default 
in debt payment. Two years after the calamitous outbreak of the 
Black Death subsided (in 1352), the use of penal bonds incr:eased 
dramatically, and they were also used to enforce debts.10 Similarly, 
after the Plague, English courts reversed their position on remedies 
for detinue of charters when they instituted the harsher penalty of 
valuing the instrument by the interest it protected without requiring 
any showing of actual loss (p. 102). Finally, the frequency with 
which uses were employed increased dramatically after the Black 
Death. The development of the use allowed members of the upper 
landholding orders to pay debts off posthumously from their land 
holdings, which had previously gone to heirs who were not held 
responsible for debt repayment (p. 121). . 
The second and primary objective of the central authority was 
to prevent the lower orders from gaining power or status in relation 
to the upper orders. The government attempted to force the lower 
orders to stand up to their traditional obligations in the face of eco-
nomic reality. As the glut in the labor pool gave way to a relative 
shortage, laborers gained an increase in bargaining power for their 
services. In order to ensure the production of food and services, the 
government enacted the Ordinance of Labourers11 in 1349 and the 
Statute of Labourers12 in 1351 (pp. 17, 21). These legislative acts 
represented the most comprehensive governmental regulation of 
English society in the era. Palmer contends that they were enacted 
to preserve the status quo between the laboring and nonlaboring 
feudal classes in the social hierarchy. With this legislation, the cen-
8. Detinue had previously required only that the borrower of a legal instrument return it 
to its rightful owner. P. 92. 
9. Uses were the forerunners of the modern trust in which one or more individuals held 
legal title for the benefit of another, who held the equitable interest P. 111. 
10. According to Palmer, the new legal theory embracing the use of penal bonds in the 
context of debts based on a condition precedent was enunciated in Executors of Moigne v. 
Haunsard, Y.B. 26 Edw. 3, fol. 17, pl. 9 (1352). Englishmen were thereafter subject to pen-
alty for nonpayment of debts without running afoul of the usury laws. P. 81. 
11. Ordinance Concerning Labourers and Servants, 1349, 23 Edw. 3, chs. 1-7 (Eng.). 
12. Statute of Labourers, 1351, 25 Edw. 3, chs. 1-7 (Eng.). 
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tral government made obtaining a sufficient work force at reason-
able wages a kingdomwide concern. Previously, such matters were 
handled through either local regulation or the common law (p. 15). 
The Ordinance of Labourers required that all healthy non-
self-sufficient people under sixty years of age work at reasonable 
wages until the end of their agreed term. The ordinance forbade 
charitable gifts for those who were able to work. The Statute of 
Labourers explicitly specified the wage levels for a number of occu-
pations (p. 21 ). In 1364, Parliament also mandated that merchants 
deal in only one kind of merchandise while artisans were limited to 
one kind of craft (p. 22). Further, sumptuary legislation stipulated 
the appropriate dress and diet for certain types of laborers.13 
With the Ordinance and Statute of Labourers regulating the 
structure of the workforce, workers had less incentive to work well. 
Forced work and wage restrictions meant that they would not be 
compensated for doing superior work. It then became incumbent 
on the government to regulate the quality of the work. To that end, 
government, through chancery, expanded the scope of liability for 
workers for negligent performance or nonperformance by issuing 
new writs of assumpsit and trespass on the case.14 Assumpsit in-
volved nonwritten agreements and trespass on the case pertained to 
harms that were inflicted indirectly by the defendant's actions. 
These writs were the primary source of law and justices had no au-
thority to go beyond the four comers of the document. Assumpsits 
originally grew out of detinue, as bailment. After the Black Death, 
they became based on covenant, where nonfeasance as well as mis-
feasance became sanctionable as the scope of the government's 
legal coercion expanded. Unlike the old trespass vi et armis, no 
force was required for liability to be found under a writ of assump-
sit. Palmer alleges that the variability in writ forms in assumpsit 
and the growth in the number of writs predicated on trespass on the 
case indicated that these remedies were implementations of the 
government's social policy rather than any conceptual break-
through in the law (p. 143). Palmer places the true origins of these 
writs after the Black Death in 1352, with the introduction of a 
number of new writs. 
Beyond the simple introduction of new writs, the concept of sci-
enter came to provide a basis for case liability for people who 
knowingly kept animals that subsequently caused damage. This 
legal theory expanded upon incitement claims and further ensured 
13. The appropriate dress for servants, "craftsmen and yeoman, esquires and gentlemen, 
merchants, knights, clergy, and plowmen" was prescribed. P. 22. 
14. According to Palmer, assumpsit covered negligent carriers, builders, doctors, shep-
herds, clothworkers, and assorted artisans and laborers (pp. 171-210), while the remedy of 
trespass on the case was available for use against farriers and innkeepers (p. 217). 
May 1995] Legal History 1773 
that people would live up to their obligations (p. 250). The narrow 
circumstances under which scienter liability arose also supposedly 
indicated tight chancery control. Also, strict liability was imposed 
on jailers and innkeepers where damage was either done by es-
caped prisoners or done to the goods held by people staying at the 
inn. 
Palmer contends that the vast scope of the legal initiatives after 
the Black Death, both in centrally exercised and in delegated au-
thority, is an index of the sudden and great expansion of state 
power. Such an enormous increase in state power, in turn, is indica-
tive of the shift of the English government to a government of in-
herent authority, a government responsible for the regulation and 
direction of the whole of English society. 
* * * 
Robert Palmer's aims are grand and his argument is· simple. He 
explains virtually all of the actions taken by an increasingly active 
English government in the mid-to-late fourteenth century as moti-
vated by the pursuit of a single goal: to force everyone in the king-
dom to live up to the obligations that traditionally attached to their 
respective positions in the social hierarchy. Palmer's theory is com-
mendable because it provides an easily understood structure for 
comprehending the wide variety of changes in English law and gov-
ernance in the aftermath of the Black Death. His theory compares 
favorably with a number of traditional historical accounts of the 
era, which usually categorize the changes as ad hoc, fragmented, 
and unrelated events that came about due to the impressive efforts 
of a single man, King Edward III, and his government. 
Palmer, however, understands that his thesis - that English 
government underwent an essential transformation due to the in-
tentional attempt to use the law to control society - is intrinsically 
difficult to prove (p. 6). He further admits that he is unable to lo-
cate a "smoking gun" causally linking legal innovations to the Black 
Death (p. 61 ). Although Palmer acknowledges the difficulty of 
demonstrating a direct connection between the recognized social ef-
fects of the Black Death and governmental policy, he contends that 
it does not detract from the overall quality of the book (pp. 6, 103). 
This is not entirely accurate because providing an evidentiary link 
would certainly strengthen his case. Of greater importance, how-
ever, is Palmer's failure to provide stronger evidentiary support for 
his theory that the government was acting with the intention of pre-
serving England's social order. Because Palmer makes the actual 
intent behind the general governmental policy an important ele-
ment of his thesis, his failure to provide stronger support is a signifi-
cant flaw. · 
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It must be noted that Palmer makes a good effort at supporting 
his theory with the evidence at hand. He submits some interesting 
circumstantial evidence in support of the notion that a grand gov-
ernmental plan motivated the numerous legal innovations of the 
era. Palmer notes that there was no separation of powers in the 
medieval English scheme of governance (p. 298). As a result, the 
courts and the exchequer were in constant contact with each other 
(p. 10) and could formulate and impose broad government initia-
tives. This structural argument is supported by Palmer's emphasis 
on the timing of the actual legal innovations that came out of chan-
cery. He invariably places their adoption as following on the heels 
of the Black Death, although he recognizes their roots in the period 
preceding the Plague (p. 103). Thus, Palmer initially shows how the 
government was capable of acting in concert to implement a plan, 
and then he demonstrates how governmental actors acted again in 
concert in response to the Black Death. 
Palmer could have bolstered his theory that the government was 
acting according to a grand plan if he had been able to provide 
some contemporary sources indicating how legal innovations, such 
as the Statute of Labourers, were viewed by the Englishmen of that 
era. Readers are presented with no evidence as to whether these 
innovations were viewed in conjunction with a more comprehensive 
social engineering policy, or whether they were seen as individual 
ad hoc responses to specific problems. In all fairness to the author 
and other medieval historians, there may be no extant sources on 
this topic. Given the impressive nature of Palmer's appendices, it is 
possible that no surviving personal correspondence, church records, 
popular literature, or similar records shed light on this subject. 
Without such information, though, it is difficult to determine 
whether English elites actually perceived the labor shortage as a 
threat to their economic bargaining power. Palmer seems to infer 
this state of mind by the very existence of the Statute of Labourers 
itself. This sort of bootstrap argument does not provide any real 
support for his theory. 
Perhaps Palmer inferred the mindset of the English upper or-
ders not from the historical period, but from a book known to all 
medieval-Renaiisance historians, Jacob Burkhardt's The Civilisa-
tion of the Renaissance in ltaly. 15 In his seminal work, Burckliardt 
contends that the increased social mobility that resulted from the 
Black Death led Italians - especially lower-born Italians - to rec-
ognize that they possessed the ability to change the circumstances 
of their lives. In short, they came upon the notion of free will. 
Burckhardt attributes the rise of the Renaissance in Italy to this 
15. JACOB BURCKHARDT, THE CivIUSATION OF THE RENAISSANCE IN ITALY (S.G.C. 
Middlemore trans., 1904). 
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fundamental change in the medieval mindset. It seems unlikely, 
however, that the English upper orders Palmer discusses actually 
anticipated this monumental change. 
Having made the government's intent to expand its powers a 
major part of his grand theory, Palmer goes to great lengths to fit 
every sirigle social and legal innovation into this scheme. Occasion-
ally Palmer goes too far. The most glaring example of Palmer fit-
ting square pegs into round holes occurs when he does not 
adequately explain how the upper orders' failure to carry out their 
commercial obligations actually presented a threat to the English 
social order. Such debts appear to have remained among the elites; 
these debts do not seem to have presented an opportunity for socio-
economic mobility amongst the lower orders. Furthermore, Palmer 
contends elsewhere in the book that England did not suffer from an 
economic crisis until decades after the 1348-1350 onset of the 
Plague. Perhaps the threat was not economic but social, because 
the widespread failure to carry out commercial obligations might 
have created strife among the ruling elite. The nature of the threat 
is never made clear. The indefinite nature of the threat posed by 
unreliable commercial relations undermines Palmer's theory that 
the changes in English law in this period were more than mere ex-
pressions of the growth in landowners' rights in relation to the 
Crown. 
The strongest part of Palmer's argument is his theory that gov-
ernmental policy generated the new theories of liability that were 
derived from writs. Palmer maintains that the new writ forms were 
not created by innovative lawyers and justices in accordance with 
the internal logic of the law, as traditional commentators suggest. 
The author further submits that the justices were in constant close 
contact with the King and the Chancellor (pp. 297-98). Because the 
writs were issued by chancery and justices had no authority to go 
beyond the four corners of the document (p. 297), Palmer effec-
tively persuades the reader that these new writs could not have 
been derived from a universal understanding of th~ common law 
among the English justices. It seems far more likely that they were 
promulgated from a single source. 
Palmer also contends that the variability in writ forms indicates 
tight chancery control over legal innovations, and that each writ 
was carefully crafted in response to particular social problems (p. 
143). Unfortunately Palmer is still unable to tie chancery control 
over the new theories of. liability to the overall goal of preserving 
the feudal system. Even if the general policy underlying the new 
theories of liability was the same, writ variability might only indi-
cate that the government was responding on a consistent - albeit 
an ad hoc - basis to similar problems over a significant period of 
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time. This policy could have been as unformed and intuitive as sim-
ply increasing the scope of existing liability in response to the prev-
alence of shoddy work and the inconsistency of commercial 
relationships. Palmer strains to argue that creating strict liability 
for innkeepers was somehow relS:ted to the goal of keeping the up-
per and lower orders separate and distinct in the social hierarchy. 
Although the Black Death may have created a variety of 
problems to which English government responded in a consistent 
fashion, attributing intention without evidence is akin to positing a 
conspiracy theory of hi~tory. Palmer would do well to dispense 
with his claim that the English government had a grand plan and 
spent decades "coercing" an entire society to follow it. Although 
all law may be read to be coercive, it is unclear whether English law 
of the era was aimed at "preserving" society or merely responding 
to limited policy needs created by the Black Death. Responding to 
similar problems in a similar manner only indicates a consistency in 
reasoning or a familiarity with recently made decisions or prece-
dent; it does not necessarily indicate a single motivating force. 
Although Palmer ultimately fails to prove that the English gov-
ernment acted with the intent of preserving the social order, future 
research may bolster his position. This notwithstanding, if Palmer 
were to remove claims of intentionality from his thesis and make 
his book a more purely descriptive account of how the English gov-
ernment responded to the Black Death with a number of legal in-
novations, and was in tum transformed by those innovations, his 
book would lose little if anything in the process. The intentionality 
claim is in no way central to the originality or importance of his 
major thesis. Palmer's central claim - that the English govern-
ment was transformed into a government of inherent authority -
can stand on its own. The circumstances that Palmer contends 
bound future governments to the new nature of governance seem 
equally applicable to the regimes that originally devised the legal 
initiatives. The broad scope of the legal initiatives that came into 
being in the aftermath of the Black Death required a significant 
expansion of centrally exercised and delegated power in order to 
support and enforce the new initiatives. Because the legal innova-
tions remained good law in England, the expansion of governmen-
tal authority into every comer of English life became permanent (p. 
306). 
Palmer presents a strong, if circumstantial, case for his theory 
that numerous legal initiatives were instigated as a result of the 
Black Death and that the authority of the central government in-
creased substantially because of these initiatives. Whether the ex-
tent of the increase in authority transformed the essential nature of 
English governance is an intrinsically difficult question to answer. 
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There is no· bright line a government must cross before it becomes a 
government of inherent authority. Semantics aside, English Law in 
the Age of the Black Death, 1348-1381, represents a unique and 
worthwhile effort. Even if Palmer occasionally overextends himself 
in an effort to explain the transformation of English governance in 
simple terms, his book is an extraordinarily cohesive and logical ac-
count that enables readers to come . to grips with fundamental 
changes in English law and governance with little difficulty. Read-
ers, especially those with an interest in mec;lieval history, should 
thoroughly enjoy the fruits of Palmer's labors. 
- Daniel B. Kosove 
